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Abstract 
Disputes concerning industrial legacies such as the disposal of toxic wastes illustrate 
changing pressures on corporations and governments. Business and governments are 
now confronted with managing the expectations of a society increasingly aware of the 
social and environmental impacts and risks associated with economic development and 
demanding more equitable distribution and democratic management of such risks. The 
closed managerialist decision-making of the powerful bureaucracies and corporations of 
the industrial era is informed by traditional management theory which cannot provide a 
framework for the adequate governance of these risks. Recent socio-political theories 
have conceptualised some key themes that must be addressed in a more fitting approach 
to governance. We identify more recent management and governance theory which 
addresses these themes and develop a process-based approach to governance of 
environmental disputes that allows for the evolving nature of stakeholder relations in a 
highly complex multiple stakeholder arena.  
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1.0 Introduction 
A series of corporate scandals and disputes over industrial legacies such as toxic wastes 
has put public pressure on corporations to conduct their business within a moral context, 
which entails anticipating and appreciating their effects on communities (Dawson, 
2004). Key examples such as notorious episode of Love Canal have focussed public 
attention on incidents such as toxic materials and wastes. Corporations are increasingly 
required to move from a system of governance based on agency theory and an inwardly 
focused set of rules, procedures and codes of practice to a form of governance that 
allows for the evolving nature of stakeholder relations in a highly complex multiple 
stakeholder arena (Clarke, 2004). As corporate credibility is called into question, other 
traditional institutional sources of authority and legitimacy are also challenged by a 
highly reflexive public (Beck, 1992; Beck, 1999). Hence both business and 
governments need to reframe their internally-focussed perspective on governance to one 
that allows for communicating and decision-making on social and environmental issues 
with very different sets of stakeholder expectations (Dawkins, 2004). Disputes 
concerning industrial legacies such as the disposal of toxic wastes illustrate these 
changing pressures on corporations and governments. Both must now address the 
expectations of a society increasingly aware of the social and environmental risks 
associated with economic development and demanding that these risks be distributed 
more equitably and managed more democratically (Livesey, 2003). 
 
The papers in this collection explore a range of factors that must be taken into 
consideration in governance for such decision-making, taking the case example of the 
disposal of HCB waste stored by Orica at their plant in Botany, Sydney. This paper 
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aims to set the backdrop to the considerations raised by later papers that must be 
factored into new considerations of appropriate governance. These considerations 
include access to resources (Jensen-Lee, this volume); the relationship between different 
forms of knowledge (Healy, this volume) identity and symbolic capital (Benn and 
Jones, this volume); access to information and systems of supervision of risk that 
impact on its distribution (James, this volume). 
 
In our overarching paper, we aim to provide a review of current understandings of what 
could be appropriate governance of multiple stakeholder decision-making on 
environmental and social issues and to develop a generic approach to managing 
stakeholder involvement. By appropriate governance we mean the policies, structures 
and processes that enable control and coordination of stakeholder decision-making and 
that will facilitate the development of a set of shared values concerning the issue in 
question (Stewart and Jones, 2003). Our definition of governance is broad and 
contemporary – relating not primarily to the activities of government but to the 
processes of interactions between social actors, groups and both public and private 
institutions (Kooiman, 1993). This understanding does not presume a decline of the 
state but rather a more interactive state where public-private interaction enables 
sustaining coordination and coherence between a wide variety of actors (Pierre, 2000).  
In addressing this aim, we firstly review the extent to which traditional organizational 
management and governance theory and practice deal with decision-making in 
situations where social and environmental issues and impacts that concern multiple 




2.0 Themes in traditional management theory 
 
2.1 Resource-based and strategic management theory 
Two competing approaches to future planning and decision-making dominate 
contemporary organizational management literature. These are resource-based theory 
and strategic management theory.  Both have only a limited capability to address issues 
of redistribution, inclusion and equity in the management of risk. Basically both 
resource-based and strategic management theories assume that organizations are 
‘narcissistic and self-serving’ (Starkey and Crane, 2003: 229). Both theories privilege 
economic development and economic growth, the pursuit of individual interests and 
technocratic innovation (Crane, 2000).  
 
Strategic management theory, still the dominant theory espoused in business schools 
and by academic management theorists, largely focuses on the company and its external 
competitive environment (eg Porter, 1980) ignoring the value of the natural 
environment. Resource-based theory is a more recent development and also exercises a 
strong influence on management practice, in particular challenging the external focus of 
traditional strategic management. It highlights the need for a fit between the external 
business environment and the more intangible and non-imitable features of the 
organization such as its skilled personnel (‘human resources’) (Drucker quoted in 
Kochan, 2003). Positive community relationships and NGO partnerships are another 
way of developing a strategically important resource based on human capital 
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(Elkington, 1998). Through the lens of this theory, bridging relationships to external 
organizations and community bodies builds reputational and social capital - both 
tradeable resources (Adler and Kwon, 2002).  
 
Both traditional strategic management and resource-based theory largely ignore the 
natural environment - the source of material resources for all forms of organizations. 
Their highly instrumental and competitive approaches have limited compatibility with a 
governance system emphasising meeting the expectations of a range of stakeholders and 
generating shared values and perspectives on shared problems. 
 
 
2.2 Stakeholder theory 
Even more recently, versions of resource-based theory that take into account relations 
with stakeholders external to the organization, have been merged with traditional 
corporate social responsibility (CSR) theories to be reconceptualised as ‘stakeholder 
theory.’ According to UK Government official CSR website, ‘CSR encourages 
companies to look at a wider range of stakeholder interests, which as well as bringing 
social and environmental benefits, can also be good for business’. For instance, ‘It can 
widen a company’s understanding of its potential risks and opportunities’ (CSR Gov 
UK, 2006). Stakeholder theory conceptualizes the managing of stakeholder relations 
and theorises their importance to an organization and has been increasingly applied to 
both public and private sector organizations (see for example: Waddock, Bodwell, and 
Graves, 2002; Warhurst, 2001; Zadek, 2001). A stakeholder is ‘any group or individual 
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who can effect or is affected by the achievement of the organization’s objectives’ 
(Freeman, 1984: 46). In this theory, a successful organization is one which at least 
satisfies but preferably adds value for all stakeholders, not just shareholders. Some 
writers have made serious attempts to go further and conceptualise an ‘ecocentric’ 
organization which could feature the natural environment as a key stakeholder (Starik 
and Rands, 1995). According to Shrivastava (1995: 130): 
Organizations in the ecocentric paradigm are appropriately scaled, provide 
meaningful work, have decentralised participative decision-making, have 
low earning differentials among employees, and have non-hierarchical 
structures. They establish harmonious relationships between their natural 
and social environments. They seek to systematically review natural 
resources and to minimise waste and pollution.  
In general, ecocentric management theorists hold the view that significant value changes 
are required for a corporation to integrate sustainability into their business operations. 
For instance, Gladwin, Kennelly and Krause (1995: 899) argue that these values 
include: ‘stewardship, equity, humility, permanence, precaution and sufficiency’. 
According to these broad versions of stakeholder theory, governance for social and 
environmental risk would be a matter of organizations internalising their social and 
environmental costs.  
 
 
2.2.1 Limitations of stakeholder theory 
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Nevertheless stakeholder theory has only a limited capacity to inform governance 
systems that would guarantee the equitable management of risk. For example, it does 
not show how to operationalise a system of governance that integrates the concerns of 
humans and non-humans as stakeholders. The ‘ecocentric’ theorists draw mainly on 
industrial ecology (Ehrenfeld, 2000) and natural capitalism models (Hawken, Lovins, 
Lovins, 1999) to explain how corporations can operationalise economic and 
environmental goals simultaneously. Both industrial ecology and natural capitalism rest 
upon technocentric principles. Neither is concerned with the principles of participatory 
or inclusive decision-making. New technologies will be a vital element in achieving 
sustainability but ‘techno-fixes’ will be insufficient solutions in themselves. No matter 
how sophisticated the technology, in the end people determine whether the technology 
works and to what ends. 
 
Another limitation relates to the underlying constructs of narrow and broad stakeholder 
theories. Narrow stakeholder theory is based on concepts of agency theory and 
individualism while the broad version is based on stewardship theory and the 
obligations of the collective (Sundaramurthy and Lewis, 2003). However, governance, 
stakeholder and sustainability are loose terms, readily deployed into the rhetoric of a 
range of vested interests. Hence we have the broad version of stakeholder theory 
espoused in the rhetoric of ‘green evangelism’ and the ‘win-win-win’ case for 
sustainability (See for example: Grayson and Hodges, 2004; Warhurst, 2001). This 
interpretation tends to gloss over any conflict between economic development and 
sustainability values (Newton and Harte, 1997). Consequently the approach lacks a 
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critical perspective on the power relations within and between stakeholder groups 
(Banerjee, 2005).  
 
In the rhetoric of traditional management discourse, good governance is about achieving 
the best management of organizational assets and resources. According to Clarke 
(2004), this point of view is based on the assumption that if systems of control are not 
implemented, the behaviour of managers will be self-serving. So broad stakeholder 
theory is seen as limited by issues of multiple accountability and weakening agency 
(Bergkamp, 2002; Sternberg, 2000). If organizations are answerable to all stakeholders, 
so the narrow stakeholder theorists argue, then accountability is lost. As Bergkamp 
(2002: 147) puts the narrow stakeholder case: 
Measuring performance against a profit maximisation objective is relatively 
easy but measuring performance against the objective of balanced 
stakeholder benefits is fraught with difficulty. 
This instrumental perspective highlights a problem common to all streams of traditional 
management theory. It does not address the ethical guidelines which must underpin a 
more inclusive and ecologically equitable governance system for the management of 
risk (Grace and Cohen, 1998). As Orts points out, some moral issues, such as the 
obligation to consider the impact of environmental risks, are ‘more important than 
stakeholder theory can accommodate’ (Orts, 2002: 228). Some scholars have argued 
that instead of the endless search for stakeholder priority we should be looking to set 
these issues in law in the form of a ‘licence to operate’ (Banerjee, 2005; Elkington, 
1998).  Others put the point that these measures will only be meaningful if they emerge 
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from the ‘moral transformation’ of corporate leaders an issue on which stakeholder 
theory is silent (Crane, 2000: 673).  
 
Even stakeholder theory, despite its promises, does not offer an alternative operational 
framework for implementing an integrated perspective on governance on social and 
environmental issues such as are associated with industrial toxic legacies or other 
examples of negative impact on society and the natural environment. It remains 
conceptually limited by the pluralist assumption that all stakeholders can compete with 
equal resources and information in the decision-making arena. Where there are multiple 
and diverse stakeholders and disparities of power, stakeholder theory offers no 
constructive guidelines for the creation of effective governance systems that will 
produce equitable outcomes. As we have argued, in practice disparities in power, 
diversities of interests and conflicting ethical principles in the management of risk are 
downplayed in an eager approach to get business on board the ‘sustainability makes 
good business sense’ bandwagon. Domination of the weak by the strong is often 
concealed in consensus based dialogue and ethical principles compromised in the rush 
to achieve a pragmatic solution. Stakeholders in environmental disputes, for instance, 
may steer discussions towards trade-offs or reframing of issues in order to achieve 
resolution. As Blattberg (2000) points out, management theory on stakeholder 
interaction basically espouses the instrumental notion that corporations should take a 
more responsible position in terms of dealing with these risks because it is better for 
their longterm profit-making.  As in the case of the HCB dispute, the local community 




Leading management theories have major limitations in achieving inclusion and equity 
through stakeholder interactions. The theories are either constrained by narrow concepts 
of economic development and contestable approaches to shareholder accountability or 
lost in a directionless argument concerning stakeholder priorities. We conclude 
therefore that the leading forms of contemporary management theory provide little help 
in constructing an effective multiple stakeholder governance system for dealing with 
environmental or social negative impacts and risks. They only serve to reinforce the 
notion that the corporation, operating as a set of independent fragments (such as internal 
and external stakeholders, shareholders, the natural environment etc), hunts for profit as 
a value conceptually distinct from all others. We take Blattberg’s view (2000: 180) that 
the model for responsible corporate governance would be one which would conceive of 
the corporation as a community embedded within a community, one where the various 
risks and goods at stake in stakeholder claims are seen as integrated with each other – 
open to a ‘non-compromising reconciliation as a means of overcoming conflicts 
between them’. Rather than negotiation, the model for governance would facilitate 
conversation and critical debate. Simply put, the model would allow for the corporation 
to act responsibly in all its activities (Blattberg 2000: 183). 
 
3.0 Themes in socio-political theory 
 
3.1 Traditional versions of democratic theory 
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In this section we look to developments in socio-political theory for guidance on a new 
approach to such needed systems of governance. As a number of scholars have argued, 
traditional systems of democracy are constrained at their ideological base in terms of 
preventing and managing these contemporary forms of risk (eg Eckersley, 1992; 2004). 
On the one hand, the principles of economic liberalism such as minimalist government, 
individualism and market fundamentalism are characteristically weak in providing the 
protection and management of public goods (Eckersley, 1992; Stewart and Jones, 
2003). On the other, social democracy’s dependence on state intervention and on 
bureaucratic administrative and planning systems often results in cumbersome decision-
making procedures which can minimise public participation and review processes and 
engagement, thus limiting the collaboration needed for effective participatory risk 
management and the development of local innovative solutions to environmental 
problems (Farrell and Morris, 2003; Goodin, 1992).  
 
An increasing number of political theorists now argue that neither system is suitable for 
dealing with multiple stakeholder decision-making involving complex issues of social 
and environmental impact and risk. Both points of view rest on shared understandings 
of liberal pluralism: both aim ‘to reach a fair and efficient compromise’ between 
differing individual points of view (Miller, 1993: 74). When powerful actors such as 
corporations have considerable economic resources and strategic interests at stake in the 
allocation and management of risk, the problems of achieving fair and reasonable 
assessment of individual preferences are often compounded. 
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The key principle of the pluralist tradition is the competition between interest or 
pressure groups which are seen as composed of coalitions of like-minded citizens. The 
assumption is that all citizens have similar capacity (such as time and information) to 
form interest groups. Many minorities which do not have this capacity are effectively 
excluded or their role is minimised. Nor does pluralist theory give consideration to the 
potentially diverse make up of any particular interest group – homogeneity within the 
group is assumed regardless of diversity within a group.  
 
These issues become further problematic when alternatives presented to voters involve 
highly technical and interdisciplinary areas of knowledge associated with high degrees 
of uncertainty. The dependence of many environmental decisions on knowledge of this 
kind further compromises the capacity of a pluralist system to ensure all interest groups 
are equally equipped with the solution-finding capacity needed to fully understand and 
defend their interest position or reach the equitable compromise (Eckersley, 2004).  
 
These limitations underpinning the traditional systems of democracy have prompted the 
development of a number of socio-political theories designed to address some of the 
issues of control, coordination and the development of shared values that we aim for in 
more suitable approaches to governance.  
 
 
3.2 Reflexive modernization 
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Reflexive modernization theorists place their argumentation in the context of post-
industrial society. The key point of this body of theory is that the processes of 
globalisation are parallelled by processes of individualisation and that these processes 
cause or drive the emergence of an increasingly self-critical, reflexive ‘risk society’ 
(Beck, 1992; Beck, 1999; Beck and Beck-Gernsheim, 2002). Since the transition from 
industrial to post-industrial society involves new and often incalculable forms of risk – 
financial, social and environmental – we need new institutions, new practices, new 
relationships, structures and processes in order to provide adequate governance 
(Backstrand, 2003). 
 
According to Beck, the individualisation of politics resulting from the retreat of 
traditional institutions will lead to potentially more inclusive decision-making in a new 
‘sub-political’, extra-parliamentary arena (Beck, 1992). This approach stems from a 
recognition that traditional systems of authority, be they political, administrative, legal 
or scientific have facilitated and legitimated modernization processes associated with an 
institutionalized underestimation of risk. In this context, it is argued that dissatisfaction 
with the congestion of traditional institutional processes militates in favour of the 
formation of temporary and multiple stakeholder networks operating as decentralized, 
self-determining, dynamic, flexible arenas for decision-making will also enable new and 
more democratic ways of decision making around areas of risk (Beck, 1992). Reflexive 
modernization theorists argue that these new political structures will not only be more 
inclusive but will allow the entry of new forms of knowledge resulting from the 
recognition and admittance of unawareness of the side-effects of industrialisation. 
Previously closed circles of expert groups, for instance, are confronted with conflicts 
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and challenges, leading to the development of what Beck terms ‘non-linear knowledge’ 
(Beck, 1998: 96). As Tsoukas (1999: 509) points out, the ongoing ‘reflexive monitoring 
of action’ will have major implications for both individuals and organizations.  
 
Arguably, however, as the theory stands, optimisation of the 'sub-political' model relies 
upon high levels of communication and approximation of consensus between competing 
interests. Unless the theory is redefined and the process method of decision-making 
more specifically addressed, the reflexive modernization approach shares the limitations 
of liberal pluralism (Schlosberg, 1999). 
 
 
3.3 Deliberative democracy 
Luskin and Fishkin (2004: 1) define the processes of deliberative decision-making 
as follows:  
Deliberating citizens seek relevant information, reflect on the issues, and 
exchange views with others. The most valuable kind of deliberation is 
balanced, taking account of information both convenient and inconvenient 
to given arguments and alternatives, although much naturally occurring 
deliberation is of course highly imbalanced.  
Based on their research, these writers argue that the process of deliberation increases the 
political efficacy of individual citizens through enabling better communication of expert 
information and thus ensuring all interest or community groups can contribute to the 
critical assessment of the environmental or social issue in question.  
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Deliberative decision-making emphasizes the processes of reflection and deliberation, 
citizens are selected then consider relevant information from a number of different 
perspectives, are given opportunity for critical conversation on the issues and then 
reconsider their original opinion (Carson, 2001). Rather than consensus, the aim is to 
achieve impartiality and full knowledge of critical issues. 
 
The limitations of deliberative decision-making relate to the potential for the 
deliberative decision-making arena to be influenced by political manipulation and 
differences in power. However, its techniques are strongly advocated by many public 
policy and civic science theorists and are noted by Carson in this volume. For instance, 
deliberative democracy methods which aim to foster public debate through ensuring 
fuller information can be used to bring together lay, expert and indigenous knowledge 
and thus establish a more communicative model of science.  Such a model is more 
relevant to decision-making for governance in conditions of uncertainty and risk. As 
Backstrand (2003) points out, traditional science is not well equipped to deal effectively 
with the uncertainty characterising many environmental decisions.  
 
 
3.4 Radical pluralism 
Radical pluralism has emerged in reaction to the well known problems with classical 
pluralism, discussed previously. As a critique of classical pluralism, radical pluralism 
draws from the postmodern concerns for identity, challenging the assumption of 
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conventional pluralism that the interest group has an ‘essential’ identity. According to 
radical pluralist theory, interest group identity is constructed in relation to others – a 
process necessarily involving exclusion (Wenman, 2003). As a consequence, diverse 
viewpoints within interest groups are often suppressed. 
 
Radical pluralism has been taken up by theorists concerned with environmental justice 
who part company with Beck’s (1992) interpretation of the democratically experienced 
nature of risk in the ‘risk society’. For example, the main concern of the environmental 
justice movement is that the risks associated with industrial development have been 
borne by those communities and individuals least able to deal with the consequences of 
these risks. As well, those groups or individuals within interest groups who are less 
resourced, either in economic or expert terms, can be marginalized through the process 
of pluralist interest group construction.  
 
In applying radical pluralism theory to environmental justice issues, Schlosberg (1999) 
argues that contemporary environmental movements are characteristically pluralistic. 
They encompass many different understandings of, and experiences with risk but these 
differences are not recognised by conventional pluralism. According to Schlosberg 
(1999: 184), if process and content are taken together by applying deliberative 
principles, both inclusive decision-making and equitable distribution of risk can be 
achieved. In this case, the deliberative process will allow ‘for an institution of discursive 
practices among a plurality of positions, knowledges and understandings’ (1999: 90). 
Radical pluralism thus brings together Habermas’ concepts of ideal forms of 
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communication and notions of deliberative democracy with more post-modernist 
understandings of diversity and identity (Habermas, 1984).  
 
Schlosberg argues that non-hierarchical networks within and between the less-resourced 
elements of society, such as the environmental justice movement, are a way of 
organizing against the exploitative ‘divide and conquer’ strategies often used by 
corporations and government organizations. The network does not imply unity and 
admits differences. As Schlosberg says (1999: 118): 
It is crucial to note that networks do not necessarily form around one single 
unifying commonality. Instead, networks form and hold themselves together 
around numerous issues where there are similarities or solidarities across 
groups. The resulting mosaic itself – the movement – becomes the major 




3.5 Ecological democracy 
Suggestions by writers attempting to develop a vision of an ecological democracy are 
relevant to our defined understanding of governance as the means of enabling a 
sustaining and coordinating form of action and decision-making between a wide variety 
of actors. Such writers focus on how to articulate the public interest through the 
development of a more aware civil society and on governance problems arising from 
intergenerational and intragenerational issues. 
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For instance, Eckersley (2004) argues that, given the short term perspective of 
policymakers in current democratic systems of liberal pluralism, environmental 
considerations are inevitably downgraded in the current competition for power. If a 
democracy is to incorporate ecological concerns it must specifically ensure that 
collaborative deliberation and problem solving, not competition, underpin governance 
structures and processes (Eckersley, 2004). Legislation would be specifically designed 
for the democratic management of risk by enabling the enforcement of the 
precautionary principle and minimising externalisation of risks through measures such 
as polluter-pays. Eckersley (2004) envisions that a more active and empowered public is 
the crucial aspect of a green state. In such a state, extended citizenship rights would 
enable more inclusive decision-making across a range of stakeholders. She describes a 
deliberative ideal that is more conducive to reflexive modernization and environmental 
justice than liberal pluralist bargaining. 
 
Dryzek’s (2000) interpretation of ecological democracy is also built on the concept that 
more genuine, inclusive forms of communication would ensure more ecologically 
rational decision-making. He focuses on an achievable, rather than on an idealised, 
system of ecological democracy. According to Dryzek, the most appropriate political 
strategy would be to develop a broad public awareness that better governance of the 
natural environment would benefit all society.  
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From even such a brief summary we can see themes emerging in socio-political theory 
that address governance issues of inclusion and equity not recognised in more 
traditional pluralist forms of decision-making. The theories draw on key themes of 
decentralised forms of decision-making, less rigid organizational boundaries to allow 
for flexibility in decision-making, open and unbiased debate between individual citizens 
and organizations based on access to information and the building of an aware and 
educated civil society is necessary in order to build trust between multiple stakeholders 
that include community, government and corporates and enable creative solutions to 
intractable social and environmental problems. 
 
In an earlier section we pointed out the limitations of traditional management theory in 
providing a framework for governance of environmental and social issues that ensures 
the development of shared stakeholder values. In Table 1 we summarise more recent 
themes now emerging in the interest areas of critical management studies, narrative 
theory (Currie, 1998), social issues in management and green business. Table 1 
indicates the areas of correspondence between this more radical management theory and 
emergent themes in socio-political theory that we have identified as having the capacity 
to incorporate issues of environmental and social impact and risk. The table also points 
to key issues of importance for governance that are highlighted by these areas of 
correspondence. For example, narrative theory is an emergent body of management 
theory which can be applied to understand how stories and narratives can foster the 
development of shared levels of ecocentric consciousness within and between 
organizations, leading to a prescription for forms of governance that encourage high 
levels of communication.  
 20 
 
INSERT TABLE 1 HERE 
 
 
4.0 Emergent concepts of governance 
In essence we are arguing that governance of industrial legacies such as toxic waste 
cannot be relegated to governance theory and practice derived from the theory of either 
traditional democratic or traditional management and corporate governance theory. 
Such governance requires the injection of new ways of thinking about environmental 
values, as well as inclusion and equity through being informed by principles of reflexive 
modernity, deliberative democracy and networks. Prompted by the numbers of complex 
and difficult decisions to be made involving many stakeholders beyond business and 
government, governance as it is now postulated in the public policy, regional 
development and urban politics literature does address some of these issues. 
Contemporary writing on governance of social and environmental decision-making that 
involves multiple stakeholders does not assume that 'governance without government' 
(Peters and Pierre, 1998) is an end in itself. Rather it assumes that existing practices and 
use of resources must change if the human species is to survive (Bressers and Kuks, 
2003:69, Dovers, 2005:3) and must do so in circumstances where continuing 
uncertainty is inevitable, and continuing learning and innovation is essential 
(Rosenbaum and Bressers, 2000:668). Such approaches accept, or even embrace the 
inevitability of change in the nature of risks or human perceptions of risks and assume 
that institutions too must have adaptive or reflexive characteristics to cope with changes 
in the nature and range of stakeholders that need to be engaged in decision-making. This 
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involves actively embedding learning in the policy system so that the questions of who 
to learn from and where to learn become vital components of institutional decision-
making (Dovers and Connor, 2006:56).   
 
The engagement of multiple stakeholders is justified in this approach not as a ‘feint’ 
towards deliberative democracy, but rather as a recognition that environmental crises 
are interconnected with crises in human relations and decision-making (Boer, 1984). 
Public participation assists decision-makers in identifying public interest concerns, 
promotes environmental justice and can enhance accountability and acceptability of 
environmental decisions, and generally improving our capacity to care for the 
environment. It has a highly significant role to play in implementation of principles 
related to application of the precautionary principle in decision making and in 
comprehending issues associated with inter and intra generational equity (Richardson 
and Razzaque, 2006:165-6).   
 
 
Leading writers in the area of governance now argue that good governance in a multiple 
stakeholder context must encourage recognition by stakeholders of their 
interdependencies and power differences and the development of a shared will to move 
beyond the immediate self-interest of the affected parties (Bertels and Vredenburg, 
2004; Clarke, 2004). This is an issue addressed by regime theorists in the field of urban 
politics who argue that building stable coalitions with shared objectives between various 
levels of government and business is crucial to addressing complex issues such as 
apparently intractable disputes. These theorists recognise the messy nature of preference 
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formation which may be influenced by a whole range of experience, different 
knowledge bases, social and economic relationships. The stable coalition remains so 
because it can attract participants through the ‘power of social construction’ - that is, by 
the coalition or regime being able to construct a structure which can address the 
collective problem at hand (Stoker, 1995: 65; Stoker, 1998). 
 
In our view, however, stability and shared objectives that are accompanied by the 
development of shared values goes beyond mere partnership formation or stable regime 
formation. For instance, the increasingly prominent discourse of governance by 
partnership between public, NGO and private sector organizations (eg OECD, 2003) 
does not address the issues of stakeholder learning, involvement, information and 
engagement, even if NGO or community based groups are involved. As Head points 
out, such forms of governance may not ensure that the stakeholders are genuinely 
working towards shared objectives with a shared sense of values (Head, 2005). So-
called ‘organic’ models of governance are more networked and avoid the top down and 
inflexible approaches incompatible with a reflexive or deliberative system (Potapchuck, 
Crocker and Schahter, 1999). The ‘organic’ model focuses on the governance of 
networks, diverse policy actors or coalitions which can include organizations of 
differing types as well as individual members of the community (European 
Commission, 2000; Jones, Hesterly and Borgatti, 1997).  The goal is to develop 
problem-solving as an ongoing process of deliberation and mutual learning between 
diverse publics or stakeholders (Carlsson and Berkes, 2005). This is different from a 
consensus-seeking approach - the process is based on a clear recognition of the different 
values and interests of the various parties involved and a deep exploration of these 
 23 
differences rather than their smoothing over. These procedures are best developed if 
deliberative democracy principles are employed to ensure that the diversity of the 
interest groups is recognised and built on in order to extend the reflexive capacity of the 
risk community and deliver creative outcomes (Dedeurwaerdere, 2002).  
 
The concepts of network or horizontal governance do appear to address some of the key 
themes highlighted by socio-political theorists, such as in Beck’s original concepts of 
the ‘sub-political’ arena associated with reflexive modernization and the other key 
issues for governance such as diversity, flexibility, high levels of communication and 
reflexivity that are highlighted in Table 1. According to Head (2005: 138) this 
horizontal form of governance has fundamental advantages for the conditions we focus 
on in this volume:  
The fundamental themes here are concerned with closer and more complex 
relations between the state and civil society; embedding NGOs in the 
design, delivery and evaluation of programs; some devolution of 
government power; and a sharing of responsibility between stakeholder 
groups and bodies for achieving outcomes in policy and program areas that 
have been regarded as complex or intractable. 
 
 
4.1 Towards a horizontal process-based approach to governance 
Such a governance system as we have idealized must be based in processes such as 
those of ‘meet-understand-manage’, where multiple voices and different kinds of 
knowledge are heard rather than rules and regulations (Parr, Sier, Battarbee, Mackay 
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and Burgess, 2003: 5). But the case of HCB disposal discussed in this volume illustrates 
than establishing such a system has four substantial problems to overcome: The first 
problem is that resolving an environmental issue like the disposal of Orica’s HCB 
wastes demands considerable expert knowledge which lay members of a local 
community are unlikely to possess. As Schneider (1997: 143) has written:  
The social problem of science policy making then becomes how to make 
non expert communities knowledgeable about what a broad cross section of 
relevant experts thinks might happen and what the probabilities of those 
occurrences are.  Most important, of course, is some guidance on what the 
impacts of such occurrences could imply for environment and society. That 
consensus-assessment process is inherently a social activity – therefore not 
one for which the scientific method directly applies – and this makes many 
scientists edgy. 
In the Orica case, for example, initially the Botany community did not have the 
technical knowledge needed to understand the problem they were faced with. However 
over time they did acquire quite deep technical understanding of HCBs and of 
alternative waste disposal methods. This required, however, active networking and was 
time consuming for a small group of committed volunteers. 
 
The second problem is how to manage what are often substantial power and resource 
differences between the various stakeholders. In the Orica case, for example, the 
company had more ready access than community groups to government bureaucracies, 
politicians and in-house expertise and external advisers.   
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The third problem has to do with the level of complexity of particular environmental 
issues. Although our insights from political theory have pointed us in the direction of a 
decentralised model, we note that such forms of inter-organizational governance may 
also need to be operational at other levels than the immediate neighbourhood. In the 
case of the Botany dispute over HCB disposal, for instance, certain aspects of the 
decision-making could only take place at regional and national levels, illustrating what 
Bressers and Kuks (2003) have labeled the essentially multilevel nature of governance 
concerning environmental issues 
 
The fourth problem is to ensure that the values of the organizations and individuals 
involved support the search for realistic longer term solutions. Most organizations need 
cultural development to foster the creative capacity needed to develop policy and map 
out possible solutions. In particular large corporations need a culture more accepting of 
disorder, more willing to recognise that contestation and challenge can lead to an 
enhanced capacity for reflexive management.  
 
 
4.2 Implementing the process of horizontal governance 
The process of implementing this approach to governance requires practical strategies 
for consultation between organizations, the community and individuals. In this section 
we outline the issues with which these decision-making processes must deal and we 
 26 
suggest some relevant tools and processes which can be adapted for use in creating an 
effective decision-making process. Table 2 lists these issues. 
 
Table 2: Issues to be addressed in the process of horizontal governance  
Insert Table 2 here 
 
The issues listed above are set out in roughly chronological order but we emphasise that 
these issues have to be dealt with iteratively and cannot be resolved in a simple linear 
sequence. We briefly discuss each of the issue sets in Table 2; in doing so, we also draw 
upon well documented and widely used  problem analysis and collective decision-
making processes from the action oriented fields of deliberative democracy, 
organization development and community development to create a practical process for 
constructing an evolving organic governance system. 
 
The first issue, identifying the ‘sub political’ arena, involves some authority, group or 
organization identifying the nature of the risk that needs to be addressed and sketching 
out the relevant sub-political arena (Beck, 1992; 1999). We recognise that the 
determination of who are the stakeholders and who should be included in the sub-
political governance process is not as simple as it may appear. A useful introduction in 
determining who relevant stakeholders are can be found in Carroll (2000). As Cousins 
(2005: 37) states: “The challenge for sustainability-focused governance is to engage 
with, balance the interests of all stakeholders and seek to avoid, in Dryzek’s terms, the 
displacement of problems to other people, places and times.”  
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In considering the  processes and tools could be employed at this stage of decision-
making that would optimise the chances of success we look to an extensively used 
process by organization development/organizational change consultants is the Search 
Conference and variants known as ‘Future Search’, ‘Participatory Strategic Planning’ 
and ‘The Strategic Forum’. These participatory diagnostic approaches are well 
documented by Holman and Devane (1999). Diagnostic tools specifically designed to 
provide information on the risk issue and that can be readily combined with the search 
conference process are provided by Luginaah, Eyles and Elliot (2004). The tools include 
focus groups and targeted interviews. These tools aim to determine which groups or 
individuals may be exposed to risk, the nature of the exposure and the degree of the 
exposure. Other relevant tools can be drawn from work in the Appreciative Inquiry 
tradition but need to be adapted for use in risk management deliberations (see, for 
example, Cooperrider, 1996).  
 
The second issue involves identifying the power and resource differences between 
stakeholders.  Other contributors to this volume discus how, in the Orica case, 
significant differences in power, knowledge and resources between the various 
stakeholders involved remained unaddressed over the period of decision-making 
described in this volume. Luuginaah et al (2004) provide scanning tools which allow for 
the assessment of the socio-political context, identification of relevant stakeholders and 
the classification of these groups to map out the influence structure. In our view these 
tools need some further work to differentiate more specifically between relative access 
to power, resources such as finance and awareness/knowledge, that is, the bases of 
relative power differentials between the participating parties). 
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The third issue involves actually creating the ‘community of interest and dispute’ 
network, that is, bringing the key stakeholders together into a network that has the 
potential to deliver deliberative dialogue. The aim is to ensure that members of the 
network are engaged in meaningful exploratory dialogue and that they become 
committed to reaching a solution beyond their immediate individual self interests. It is 
vital that both commonalities and differences in views are explored, that areas where 
there is insufficient shared knowledge are identified and that a rush to superficial 
consensus is resisted. The challenge is to create a ‘transactional space’.  Transactional 
spaces refer to “places that have legitimacy – where all the cards are on the table…a 
transactional space requires all perspectives to be put on the table as an absolute 
prerequisite” (Attributed to Gristock by Buselich, 2005: 306).  
 
Luginaah et al (2004) provide ‘impact tools’ which allow assessment of how risks 
impact on different stakeholders and how these impacts can be mitigated. As the risk 
issue frequently shifts over time, these tools help stakeholders to respond to new 
circumstances. Another useful tool that can help the collective development of priority 
issues and move the parties toward accepted solutions is the Delphi Method which is 
basically a method of gaining the response of a panel of geographically dispersed 
experts to a complex problem (see Loo, 2002). Although it has encountered some 
criticism in its relatively long history as methodologically unscientific (eg Sackman, 
1974), the Delphi Method is still widely used as a communication tool to gain expert 
opinion. These qualitative tools designed to help map stakeholder response can lead to 
stakeholders accepting diversity and respecting differences in perception. This is the 
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beginning of the trust building process that is the key to the development of shared 
values – a point well recognized in the extensive literature on social capital (eg Adler 
and Kwon, 2002). 
 
The fourth issue involves negotiating the deliberative strategies that are at the heart of 
the risk resolution process. Hard decisions need to be made about issues such as which 
parties will be represented going forward in the evolving deliberative process and at 
what stages they will participate. It also needs to be decided whether they will 
participate directly or on a representative basis. Other vital areas of decision are listed in 
Table 2 above. Suitable process methodologies for this stage are provided in Holman 
and Devane (1999). Where the community is involved ‘consensus conferencing’ 
provides a method of assisting citizens participate in an informed way in policy debates 
about complex and challenging issues. In this process, dialogue takes place between a 
panel of citizens and a panel of leading experts. In the instance of the HCB dispute, the 
‘experts’ would be drawn from relevant areas of the natural and social sciences, and 
would reflect administrative and academic knowledges and capacities. The process 
works like a citizens’ jury where a representative group of people deliberate on an issue 
with the assistance of a facilitator and experts to review their areas of agreement and 
differences and seek common ground for action (Carson, 2001). The issue of who 
should fund this process raises a dilemma. Should the polluter pay or will this inevitably 
be seen as corporate capture (see Healy, this volume)? Our suggestion is that the 
process should be funded by an independent fund, an environmental trust contributed to 
by polluters but administered at a distance from them. The process itself is ‘managed’ 
by the independent facilitator.   
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The final and fifth issue involves implementing the decisions which have emerged from 
the decision-making process. This involves developing practical plans to eliminate and 
minimize risks and to share equitably the remaining potential risks; to assign 
responsibilities for actioning the plan, to allocate costs and to design ongoing 
monitoring systems. Most project managers working in large enterprises, including 
NGOs, government organizations and corporations are familiar with a range of 




We end by emphasizing some central ideas we have advanced for a process of 
governance that enable control, coordination and the development of shared values 
across a multiple stakeholder arena of decision-making such as the disposal of the toxic 
waste discussed in this volume. The goal is inclusion based on recognition of diversity 
using and developing decentralised networks, including community-based networks. 
Resulting shifts in practice entail a replacement of short-termism by long-termism and a 
balancing of organizational competition with interdependence and mutuality. Yet we 
have argued that this ideal cannot be achieved without innovative practices fostered by a 
governance system which enables debate, challenges the established order and uses 
embeddedness and interconnectedness to foster the exchange of ideas and values. We 
also reviewed several practical approaches to problem definition, decision-making and 
action planning that represent tested strategies to be integrated into an emergent set of 
participative processes for decision-making in the sub political arena. We hope that, as 
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new horizontal governance systems for dealing with environmental impact and risk of 
industry and business develop, the production of intractable wastes will cease and there 
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Table 2 : Issues to be addressed in a new model of environmental governance 
 
Factor 1. Identifying the ‘sub political’ arena:  
• nature of the risk 
• scope of the risk; extent of risk, ie who is at greatest/least risk 
• relevant stakeholders, ie those potentially affected by the risk 
• the boundaries of the sub political arena 
Factor 2. Identifying key interests of and differences between stakeholders 
• key interests 
• power differences 
• resource differences 
• awareness and knowledge differences 
• identifying relative advantage/disadvantage among stakeholders and their 
support needs 
Factor 3. Creating the ‘community of interest and dispute’ network: 
• bringing stakeholders or their representatives together 
• undertaking preliminary discussions 
• refining the identity of the sub political arena (see Factor 1 above) 
• identifying sources of required expertise 
• joint mapping of common and differing interests of stakeholder groups including 
diversity within groups (refining Factor 2 above) 
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• identifying core values of stakeholder groups 
Factor 4. Negotiating the deliberative strategies: 
• deciding on direct or indirect representation of parties 
• appointing a coordinator or coordinators and process facilitator(s) 
• designing deliberative procedures including communication options 
• developing a timeline for the process and anticipated stages 
• gaining agreement to decision-making methods including how the final decision 
will be reached 
• providing for arbitration in case of failure to reach agreement – either a 
‘citizen’s jury’ or an arbitrator; agreeing how these will be chosen, appointed, 
constituted. 
• designing support to overcome relative disadvantages identified in 2 above 
(achieving equity in resource availability; compensating for relative power, 
resource and knowledge differentials. 
Factor 5. Implementing the decisions:   
• developing practical plans to eliminate, minimize and manage risk 
• assigning responsibilities for actioning the plan 
• assigning costs of actioning the plan 
• designing and implementing monitoring systems to ensure that plans are 
achieved. 
 
 
 
 
